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URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c0101Immigrant workers from Mexico are a critical component of the supply of
labor to agriculture and many nonagricultural sectors in the United States.
They constitute 3.5 percent of U.S. labor force but are heavily concentrated
into two types of sectors: 25 percent are in services, and 29 percent are in-
volved in production and transportation occupations (Grieco and Ray
2004). The majority of U.S. farmworkers are Mexican-born. According to
the National Agricultural Worker Survey (NAWS), Mexican-born persons
represented an estimated 77 percent of the U.S. farm workforce in 1997–
1998 (up from 57 percent in 1990; U.S. Department of Labor 2000, 1991).
Since the late 1990s, most farm workers have been unauthorized (Martin,
Fix, and Taylor 2006). An overwhelming majority originate from house-
holds in rural Mexico (U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform 1997).
Two major policy changes, the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), to-
gether with intensiﬁed enforcement along the southern U.S. border, were
aimed wholly or partially at curtailing the ﬂow of unauthorized Mexico-to-
U.S. migration. The curtailment of unauthorized migration had the poten-
tial to reduce the supply of labor to these U.S. economic sectors. But the
policies had potentially counteracting eﬀects. The overall impact of
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Smith and an anonymous referee.NAFTA, IRCA, and increased border enforcement on migration is theo-
retically ambiguous and therefore must be estimated econometrically.
In this paper, we estimate a dynamic econometric model to test the eﬀect
of these policy changes on the ﬂow of migrant labor from rural Mexico to
the United States. Recognizing that policy changes may have diﬀerential
eﬀects on male and female labor migration, we estimate the eﬀects of pol-
icy changes by the gender of migrant ﬂows as well. The models are esti-
mated using retrospective data from the 2003 Mexico National Rural
Household Survey.
8.1 Conceptual Framework
We isolate the impact of three policies: IRCA, NAFTA, and increased
expenditure on enforcement along the U.S.-Mexican border. Each of these
policies has counteracting eﬀects on migration, making the overall impact
on migration ambiguous.
The IRCA had two main components. First, it made employers who
hired illegal aliens subject to ﬁnes or imprisonment. These penalties were
meant to discourage the hiring of unauthorized immigrants and reduce mi-
gration by dampening the employment expectations of migrants. Second,
IRCA provided amnesty to illegal aliens who had lived in the United States
continually since 1982 if they applied before 1988. This policy legalized
U.S. migration contacts for households throughout rural Mexico. In so
doing, it may have encouraged migration by family members of newly le-
galized migrants, while also sending a signal to rural Mexicans that future
amnesty deals might be forthcoming. Therefore, these two components of
IRCA potentially have counteracting eﬀects on immigration.
The North American Free Trade Agreement was only partially moti-
vated by migration concerns but was expected to have far-reaching impacts
on migration ﬂows. In the long run, trade liberalization policies open
North American markets to Mexico, encouraging export of goods and de-
creasing migration pressures.1That is, in the long run, trade and migration
may be substitutes. After Mexico joined NAFTA, Mexican agricultural ex-
ports to the United States did, indeed, increase. However, in the short run,
NAFTA could displace rural workers as production shifts from importa-
bles to exportables and labor markets adjust to new market realities. Com-
putable general equilibrium models predicted that the increase in labor de-
mand generated by exports to the United States would be insuﬃcient to
absorb workers displaced from agricultural activities that had been pro-
tected by government policies prior to NAFTA. This, in turn, would stim-
ulate out-migration from rural Mexico (Levy and van Wijnbergen 1992;
Robinson et al. 1991).
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1. Presidents Salinas and Bush (senior) argued this point to gain support for NAFTA.The process of dismantling protectionist agrarian policies, which began
just prior to NAFTA, was also expected to displace agricultural workers
throughout Mexico. Mexico phased out price supports for eleven agricul-
tural ﬁeld crops and the processing, storing, and marketing activities of 
the state-run National Company of Popular Subsistence (CONASUPO;
Yúnez-Naude 2003). Agricultural credit subsidies were also reduced
sharply (Yúnez-Naude and Barceinas 2004). For rural workers displaced
by policies related to NAFTA, migration may have been a vehicle to over-
come short-term ﬁnancial shocks.
The third policy that we evaluate is the increase in enforcement along the
U.S.-Mexico border. Increases in border enforcement were meant to cur-
tail unauthorized immigration. However, they could have the opposite
eﬀect by discouraging unauthorized immigrants from returning to their
home countries and thus extending their stays in the United States. In-
creased border enforcement raises smuggler fees, but family members may
be willing to pay the increased cost in order to reunite with relatives who
have extended their stays in the United States.
The possible impacts of these three policies on migration are complex
and theoretically ambiguous. The net eﬀects of these policy shocks on the
migration of labor from rural Mexico to the United States can only be de-
termined empirically. However, in order to isolate the eﬀects of policy
changes on migration, we also need to control for the plethora of indi-
vidual, household, and community variables inﬂuencing migration deci-
sions over time as well as macroeconomic shocks that aﬀect the migration
decision.
Individual, household, and community variables aﬀect the costs and
beneﬁts of migrating relative to staying at home and thus the propensity to
migrate. The propensity to migrate and obtain employment in the United
States is partly a function of migration networks and sending-area charac-
teristics. Sending-area characteristics and community-level heterogeneity
are controlled for econometrically via ﬁxed eﬀects, while migration net-
works or contacts with employed migrants in the United States are rep-
resented by lagged stocks of employed villagers in the United States. 
Networks may be gender-speciﬁc. For example, females may base their
migration decision on the knowledge that other females in the village have
succeeded in crossing the border and obtaining employment in the United
States. In order to evaluate gender-speciﬁc network eﬀects, we include sep-
arately the lagged stocks of male and female villagers employed in the
United States.
Several macroeconomic variables also may inﬂuence the beneﬁts and costs
of international migration. These variables include changes in the peso-
dollar exchange rate and in per capita gross domestic products (GDPs) of
both countries. Mexican currency devaluations increase the purchasing
power of dollars remitted to Mexico. Changes in U.S. GDP are included as
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to be positively related to migration. The impact of an increase in Mexico’s
GDP is ambiguous. On one hand, it could reﬂect employment growth that
discourages migration. On the other hand, higher income in Mexico could
provide households with the liquidity to ﬁnance investments, including in-
vestments in international migration, that is, the costs associated with
crossing the U.S.-Mexico border and establishing oneself in a foreign labor
market. Our econometric analysis controls explicitly for these variables in
order to isolate the impact of our three policy variables.
8.2 Theoretical Model
At the micro level, international migration is only observed for house-
holds and family members that choose to participate in migration, which
is a discrete decision. Migrants are individuals for whom the expected
beneﬁts of migration, R, exceed the (unobserved) migration “reservation
wage,”  . The migration reservation wage depends on local opportunities
on and oﬀ the farm. Following Mincer (1974), the local wage is a function
of human capital that aﬀects the marginal productivity of labor. Let XW
denote a vector of human capital characteristics inﬂuencing wage income
in the local labor market. The productivity of family members’ in house-
hold farm and non-farm activities is shaped both by these human capital
variables and by family assets K  . Remittances are a function of migrants’
human capital, which aﬀects earnings, as well as migrants’ motivations to
remit, which may be inﬂuenced by both human capital and family assets
(Lucas and Stark 1985; Taylor 1987). Contacts at migrant destinations,
M  K  , are a form of migration capital that can enhance the labor-market
prospects of migrants (Munshi 2003). Migration networks can be deﬁned
as “sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and
nonmigrants in origin and destination areas through . . . kinship, friend-
ship, and shared community origin” (Massey 1988, 396). These ties are
predominately formed with contacts from one’s own village and not across
villages. As we shall investigate later in the chapter, M  K  can vary according
to gender, and the eﬀects of networks on migration appear to be gender-
speciﬁc.
Migrant remittances and reservation wages have both deterministic and
stochastic components; thus, R   R(XR)   u and    (X )   v, where X 
  (XW, K  ), XR   (XW, K  , M  K  ), and u and v are stochastic errors. Letting
  1 if a household member migrates and 0 otherwise, the migration par-
ticipation decision becomes
(1)    
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grate; that is, M Σ . Let  trepresent the joint distribution of variables XR
and X  in community j at time t. Then
(2) Mjt   M( jt, Zjt),
where Zjt is a vector of community variables inﬂuencing the productivity
of labor in local activities and remittances. In the econometric model, we
control for the inﬂuences of  jt and Zjt by including lagged migration
(Mj,t–1), ﬁxed eﬀects for communities, and a time trend.
8.3 Data
The data used to estimate the model are from a nationwide rural house-
hold survey carried out jointly by El Colegio de Mexico and the University
of California, Davis. The Mexico National Rural Household Survey
(Encuesta Nacional a Hogares Rurales de Mexico [ENHRUM]) provides
retrospective data on migration by individuals from a sample of rural
households that is both nationally and regionally representative (see http://
precesam.colmex.mx). Past studies of Mexican labor supply to the United
States used proxies including border apprehensions (e.g., Torok and Huﬀ-
man 1986) or data from surveys of small numbers of villages. Usually, sur-
veys do not collect migration ﬂows over extended periods of time and thus
are unable to evaluate policies’ long-term impact on the dynamics and
trends of migration.
The ENHRUM was carried out in January and February 2003 in all ﬁve
of Mexico’s census regions. The Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Ge-
ografía e Informática (INEGI), Mexico’s national census oﬃce, designed
the sampling frame to provide a statistically reliable characterization of
Mexico’s population living in rural areas, deﬁned by INEGI as communi-
ties with fewer than 2,500 inhabitants. The survey was designed to be rep-
resentative both nationally and regionally. Rural households were selected
via a three-tiered stratiﬁed random sampling method involving states,
communities, and households randomly drawn within each community.
This method generated a sample of 1,782 households in eighty villages and
fourteen Mexican states. For reasons of cost and tractability, individuals in
hamlets or disperse populations with fewer than 500 inhabitants were not
included in the survey. The sample is representative of more than 80 per-
cent of the population that the Mexican census oﬃce considers to be rural.
The ENHRUM survey assembled complete migration histories from
1980 through 2002 for (a) the household head, (b) the spouse of the head,
(c) all individuals who lived in the household three months or more in 2002,
and (d) a random sample of sons and daughters of either the head or his or
her spouse who lived outside the household longer than three months in
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only about labormigrants.2However, data on place of residence of all fam-
ily members were gathered for 2002, regardless of employment status. For
2002, virtually all migrants were considered by family members in the vil-
lage to be labor migrants. If the same is true for earlier years, our counts of
labor migrants will also reﬂect total migration. For each year, the survey
provides information on the migrant’s sector of employment, agricultural
or nonagricultural, and the state in which he or she worked. The survey
provides the most reliable longitudinal data on migration from rural Mex-
ican communities to the United States.
The survey asked individuals to recall employment information for each
migrant from 1980 to 2002. Individuals may be unable to remember their
(or their migrant sons’ and daughters’) employment histories for twenty-
two years. However, when employment is coupled with a life event such as
international migration, there is a smaller likelihood that data will be mis-
reported. A study by Smith and Thomas (2003) showed that when respon-
dents are asked to recall information linked to salient events, such as mar-
riage or birth of a child, misreporting is insigniﬁcant. Also, individuals
asked to recall labor or migration histories reported more accurately
moves that involved either a long distance or extended stays.
To implement the survey, Mexico was divided into ﬁve regions, reﬂect-
ing INEGI’s standard regionalization of the country: Center, South-
Southeast, Center-West, Northwest, and Northeast.3 Table 8.1 summa-
rizes migration from households in rural Mexico. Sixteen percent of all
households in the sample had a family member living in the United States
at the start of 2002, the year of the survey, and 26 percent had a family
member living in another part of Mexico. Many households had more than
one migrant. The number of U.S. migrants per household ranged from 0 to
9, while the number of internal migrants ranged from 0 to 10. The average
household in the sample had 0.35 U.S. migrants and 0.71 internal migrants
in 2002—or 1.06 migrants in total.
As indicated in the table, there are sharp diﬀerences in migration ex-
perience among the ﬁve rural regions. West-Central Mexico traditionally
has been the largest sender of migrants to the United States, with far and
away the highest current participation in international migration and the
most international migration experience. In this region, nearly 28 percent
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2. The questions asked in the survey were: “¿Qué años trabajó _____ en los E.U. desde
1980? ¿En qué trabajó y en qué estado? ¿Por un salario o por cuenta propia?” (“In what years
did _____ work in the U.S. since 1980? In what job and which state? For a salary or self-
employed?”).
3. The high-migration West-Central region was the focus of Mexico Migration Project
(MMP) surveys (Population Studies Center, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia [pro-
ducer and distributor], http://www.pop.upenn.edu/mexmig/welcome.html). The MMP sur-
veyed a random sample of households within communities, but the sample of MMP commu-
nities was not random.of all households have at least one family member in the United States, and
the average household had .62 U.S. migrants. By contrast, 7.5 percent of
households in the south-southwest have U.S. migrants, with an average of
.10 U.S. migrants per household.
8.4 Econometric Model
We econometrically estimate the impact of policy reforms on three de-
pendent variables: (a) the share of villagers employed in the United States;
(b) the share of female villagers employed in the United States; and (c) the
share of male villagers employed in the United States.
For the ﬁrst dependent variable, we estimate two ﬁxed eﬀects panel data
models for all employed immigrants.
8.4.1 Model I
Model I is intended to capture the basic dynamics of rural Mexico-to-
U.S. migration. The share of village population observed as labor migrants
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Table 8.1 Migration summary statistics for rural Mexico, by region
Sample Standard 
Region/Variable Percentages mean deviation
South-south east
Households with U.S. migrants (%) 7.53 0.26
U.S. migrants per household 0.10 0.42
Household sample size 372
Center
Households with U.S. migrants (%) 14.52 0.35
U.S. Migrants per household 0.27 0.89
Household sample size 365
Center-west
Households with U.S. migrants (%) 27.75 0.45
U.S. migrants per household 0.62 1.29
Household sample size 346
Northwest
Households with U.S. migrants (%) 12.09 0.33
U.S. migrants per household 0.23 0.79
Household sample size 339
Northeast
Households with U.S. migrants (%) 19.72 0.40
U.S. migrants per household 0.54 1.43
Household sample size 360
Total
Households with U.S. migrants (%) 16.22 0.37
U.S. migrants per household 0.35 1.04
Household sample size 1,782
Source: 2003 ENHRUM survey.in the United States at time t, Mt, is regressed on the same share lagged one
year (Mjt–1) and a time trend (t), controlling for a vector of village ﬁxed
eﬀects,  j:4
(3a) Mjt    j    t    Mjt 1   ujt
Equation (3a) is a basis to estimate the dynamic structure of employed
migration and to evaluate the role of networks and the inertia of employed
migration over time. The time trend, t, captures unobserved time-varying
variables that eﬀect multiple villages, such as changes in U.S. attitudes
about immigrants. Village ﬁxed eﬀects,  j, control for unobserved com-
munity-speciﬁc characteristics that vary across villages but not over time.
Village ﬁxed eﬀects allow each village to have its own migration trajectory.
The village ﬁxed eﬀects model makes it possible to isolate the underlying
migration trend (t) and inﬂuence of networks and inertia (the lagged-
migration variable) from policy and macroeconomic variables shaping mi-
gration. We assume that networks from other villages have little or no im-
pact on the migration propensity of a given village. This assumption is
plausible, inasmuch as the communities in the survey are rural and isolated
from one another. In the event that migration from a village is inﬂuenced
by the presence of networks from another village throughout the period,
which our ﬁeld work indicates as rare, this eﬀect would become part of the
village ﬁxed eﬀect.5
8.4.2 Model II
Model II includes three policy variables: dummy variables for IRCA (1
for all time periods beginning in 1986, the year of IRCA’s implementation),
NAFTA (1 beginning in 1994, 0 before), and a continuous variable mea-
suring the percentage change in border enforcement expenditures ( BEt).
The 1980–2002 period witnessed large year-to-year increases in border en-
forcement expenditures. On one hand, an increase in enforcement from
one year to the next might deter new border crossings. Nevertheless, in ru-
ral Mexico it is rare to ﬁnd individuals who tried but did not succeed at
crossing the border, perhaps after multiple attempts. On the other hand, 
as noted by the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (1997) and the
Public Policy Institute of California (2002), heightened border enforce-
ment can also have the perverse eﬀect of deterring return migration by in-
dividuals who realize that reentering the United States will be more diﬃ-
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4. We use the percentage rather than the sum of villagers who migrated because of our con-
cern that the size of village populations in the synthetic cohorts created using retrospective
data is biased downward as one goes back in time, as individuals are removed from the pop-
ulation due to death (and thus are not available to be counted in 2003).
5. For example, our ﬁeld work reveals that in almost no instance did an individual make his
or her ﬁrst trip assisted by someone from another village. The beneﬁts of international mi-
gration networks are concentrated ﬁrst in families and next in the community of which the
family is part.cult in the future. It is not clear which of these eﬀects will dominate, par-
ticularly in the short run. We also include macroeconomic variables: the
percentage changes between time t and t – 1 in the peso-dollar exchange
rate ( ERt) and the U.S. and Mexico GDP’s ( USGDP t,  MGDP t). The
U.S. GDP changes are used as a proxy for employment growth, which
would be expected to stimulate immigration. Increases in Mexico’s GDP
could deter migration as a result of a similar employment eﬀect. However,
they could also provide households with the income to ﬁnance relatively
costly and risky international moves, as has been noted by some other stud-
ies (e.g., Schiﬀ 1996).
(3b) Mjt    j    t    Mjt 1    1IRCAt    2NAFTAit    3 BEt
   1 ERt    2 USGDP t    3 MGDP t   ujt
Our use of dummy variables to evaluate the impact of NAFTA and
IRCA warrants some explanation. Other methods are possible, including
controls for trade ﬂows or changes in real wages in Mexico and the United
States; however, these variables may not be exogenous to migration. For ex-
ample, changes in real agricultural wages in the United States are likely re-
lated to the supply of migrant labor from rural Mexico. The inclusion of
policy dummy variables in the regressions makes it possible to evaluate the
long-run impact of exogenous policy shocks on the rate and dynamic of la-
bor migration. Inclusion of the lagged-migration variable allows for the
impacts of policy shocks to unfold gradually over time.
The vector of ﬁxed eﬀects,  j,  ,  ,  k, k   1, . . . , 3 and  l, l   1, . . . , 3
are parameters to be estimated, and the ujt are stochastic errors. The use of
migration shares (Mjt) instead of diﬀerences in migration shares between
periods (Mjt– Mjt–1) as the dependent variable allows for the possibility that
  1. Under the null hypothesis of no policy impacts on migration, the co-
eﬃcients  k   0   k.
We estimate three types of dynamic ﬁxed eﬀects models for labor migra-
tion by gender (g   m, f ). The ﬁrst model is similar to equation (3a). We
estimate the share of males (females) in employed migration as a function
of a time trend (t) and the lagged share of male (female) migrants in village
populations:
(4a) Mjgt    j    t    Mjgt 1   ujt
We reestimated each equation including the lagged stock of other-gender
migrants to evaluate the gender sensitivity of network effects:
(4b) Mjgt    j    t    1Mjmt 1    2Mjft 1   u  jt
If both male and female networks shape female migration, then both  1
(lagged-female migration) and  2 (lagged-male migration) will be signiﬁ-
cant, and conversely for the male migration regression.
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equation all of the policy and enforcement and macroeconomic-change
variables. This model is similar to equation (3b) except that it includes the
lagged stock of other gender’s participation in employed migration:
(4c) Mjgt    j    t    1Mjmt 1    2Mjft 1    1 IRCAt    2 NAFTAt
   3 BEt    1 ERt    2 USGDP t    3 MGDP t   ujt
8.5 Estimation and Results
Mjgt, the dependent variable, is calculated for each of the eighty villages
in each of the twenty-three (from 1980 to 2002) years of observations.
However, one year (eighty observations) is lost due to the inclusion of
lagged right-hand-side variables. Thus, for each village we have twenty-two
annual observations, for a total sample size of 1,760 (twenty-two years  
eighty villages). The variability in migration and other variables both
across villages and over time contribute to identifying the eﬀects of net-
works and policy shocks on international migration.
The series of models given by (3a)–(3b) and (4a)–(4c) was estimated us-
ing the standard least square dummy variable (LSDV) method. This
method results in a downward bias in the estimate of  ; however, this bias
diminishes as the number of observations in the time dimension (T) in-
creases (Judson and Owen 1999). Judson and Owen show that the bias be-
comes negligible as T approaches 30. In our data set, T   23 (1980–2002,
inclusive), which indicates that there will be some bias, but it will be small.
Judson and Owen also conclude that when T is greater than 20 the bias in
the other parameter estimates is negligible. The key hypotheses that we
wish to test involve not  but, rather, the other parameters in the model (i.e.,
the eﬀects of policy variables).
Figure 8.1 presents estimated shares of populations from the surveyed
villages in U.S. farm and nonfarm jobs from 1980 to 2002. It shows an up-
ward trend in migration to the United States for both males and females.
However, the trend is steeper for males.6 Female migration is lower than
male migration and has a steady increase over the twenty-three-year pe-
riod. Table 8.2presents variable deﬁnitions and means for variables used in
the econometrics.
Table 8.3 reports the econometric results for the village labor-migrant
shares using ordinary least squares, controlling for ﬁxed eﬀects. The ﬁrst
column of table 8.3 shows results from the model that only controls for the
lagged stock of migration. The time trend is signiﬁcant and positive. The
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6. The surge in migration to the United States in the 1990s is mirrored in U.S. Census 2000
data. The U.S. Census does not provide information on where migrants originate in Mexico
(e.g., from rural or urban areas). However, they show an unexpectedly large increase in
Mexican-born persons living in the United States.coeﬃcient on lagged migration is also signiﬁcant and positive, indicating
that networks created through past migration inﬂuence current migration.
Macroeconomic variables and policies, such as NAFTA and IRCA, can
change the overall trend and inﬂuence of migration rates. Results from
Model II, which includes these variables, are reported in column (2) of
table 8.3.7 The time trend and coeﬃcient on lagged migration remain pos-
itive, large, and signiﬁcant. The dummy variables for NAFTA and IRCA
have a signiﬁcant and negative impact on migration. Therefore, the supply
of migrant labor from rural Mexico to the United States decreases after the
implementation of IRCA in 1986, and it decreases once again following
NAFTA in 1994. While the eﬀect of NAFTA may seem large (a decrease of
.75 in its year of implementation), NAFTA’s main eﬀect is to slow down the
upward trend in migration. In the year following NAFTA’s implementa-
tion and thereafter, the positive coeﬃcients on the time trend and lagged
migration once again increase migration. These ﬁndings support the
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7. Trends in migration may also be inﬂuenced by regional dynamics. When separate re-
pressors are estimated for Mexico’s ﬁve census regions, there were no diﬀerences in the signs
of signiﬁcant variables among regions for all of the models presented in this paper.
Fig. 8.1 Average share of villagers employed in United States: 1980–2002Table 8.2 Variable deﬁnitions and means
Variable Description Mean
T Time trend 11
USMIG Share of villagers employed in U.S. 4.03
Female migration Share of female villagers employed in U.S. 1.2
Male migration Share of male villagers employed in U.S. 6.84
% change ER % change in Peso-Dollar exchange rate from 
previous year 1.31
% change border control % change in INS border enforcement budget 
from previous year 13.14
NAFTA Dummy variable   1 beginning in 1994 0.39
IRCA Dummy variable   1 beginning in 1986 0.74
% change MGDP % change Mexico GDP 2.4
% change US GDP % change U.S. GDP 2.9
Table 8.3 OLS coeﬃcients for three dynamic models—Participation in migration
(USMIGt)
All regions











% change border control .011
(.003)∗∗
% change ER .015
(.004)∗∗
% change MGDP .034
(.016)∗∗
% change US GDP .051
(.022)∗∗
R2 .948
Notes: Dependent variable: Weighted total of international workers in village. All models
were estimated with village ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are in parentheses. N   1,760.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.hypothesis that NAFTA relieved migration pressures. The IRCA also tem-
porarily reduced migration, but to a smaller degree than NAFTA.8
In contrast, increases in border enforcement are associated with an in-
crease in the share of villagers working in the United States. This ﬁnding
supports the hypothesis that most migrants eventually succeed in crossing
the border and increased border enforcement discourages return migra-
tion. There is a negative correlation in the data between border expendi-
tures and return migration (not shown in the tables).
The macroeconomic variables are all signiﬁcant. The devaluation of the
peso increases the rate of migration, echoing Massey and Espinosa (1997).
This effect is of the expected sign, inasmuch as the devaluation raises the
returns to international migration (remittances) in pesos. Changes in both
countries’ GDPs increase migration. Economic expansion in the United
States pulls rural Mexicans into the country. The ﬁnding that GDP growth
in Mexico encourages migration is consistent with the argument by Schiﬀ
(1996) that income growth enables households in sending areas to ﬁnance
the cost of crossing the border and establishing migrants abroad.
Gender-speciﬁc regression results appear in table 8.4, for female migra-
tion, and table 8.5, for male migration. The column labeled “Model I” in
each table shows results for the basic dynamic regression model. When we
estimate the migration model by gender, the trend remains signiﬁcant and
positive. The lagged migration participation rate is both statistically and
quantitatively signiﬁcant. When the lagged migration rate of males is
added to the estimate of female migration (Model II in table 8.4), it has
only a small signiﬁcant impact. A 1 percentage point increase in the share
of male migrants increases female migration by only .014. The eﬀect of
lagged female migration on male migration (table 8.5) likewise is positive
and signiﬁcant but quantitatively small. A 1 percentage point increase in
the share of village females working in the United States, other things be-
ing equal, is associated with a .08-percentage point increase in male par-
ticipation in international migration. This ﬁnding suggests that labor
migration networks are gender-speciﬁc. That is, estimates of a gender’s
participation in labor migration do not improve appreciably when the
other gender’s migration network is included in our regressions.
Macroeconomic and policy variables (Model II in tables 8.4 and 8.5) sig-
niﬁcantly increase the predicative power of the migration models for both
genders.9 Qualitatively, policy changes have similar eﬀects on male and fe-
male migration, with the exception of GDP growth. However, quantita-
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8. Boucher, Smith, and Taylor (2006) examine migration from rural Mexico to U.S. farm
jobs, which constitutes a relatively small share of total migration and appears to have been
aﬀected diﬀerently by the policy shocks.
9. An F-test of restricted versus unrestricted regressions for both male and female migra-
tion shares rejected the joint hypothesis that the macroeconomic and policy variables were
jointly zero.tively the results diﬀer according to gender. The decrease in the male mi-
grant share after NAFTA is three times greater than the drop in the female
share. This suggests that female migration was more resilient to NAFTA-
related policy changes. The decrease in migration shares after implemen-
tation of IRCA is twice as large for males as females. Other things being
equal, a 1 percent increase in U.S. border enforcement has a larger positive
percentage eﬀect on male migration than on female migration (.015 and
.003, respectively). This indicates either that border enforcement increases
male stays more than female stays or, perhaps more plausibly, that border
controls are more of a deterrent to border crossings by females than by
males.
The eﬀects of changes in Mexico’s GDP are signiﬁcant only for female
migration. By contrast, changes in U.S. GDP are signiﬁcant only for male
migration. These ﬁndings may suggest that female migration is more sen-
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Table 8.4 OLS coeﬃcients for three dynamic models—Female participation in
migration (female USMIGt)
All regions













% change border control .003
(.001)∗∗
% change ER .006
(.003)∗∗
% change MGDP .021
(.010)∗∗
% change US GDP .018
(.014)
R2 .882 .884
Notes: Dependent variable: Weighted total of female international workers in village. All
models were estimated with village ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are in parentheses. N  
1,760.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.sitive to liquidity constraints that can be loosened by income growth in
Mexico, while female migrant labor demand is robust to U.S. GDP growth.
Male migration, on the other hand, appears to be sensitive to U.S. eco-
nomic growth.
8.6 Limitations and Caveats
Reliance on policy dummy variables and retrospective data to test for
eﬀects of policy changes on migration raises some questions and concerns
that should be kept in mind when interpreting the ﬁndings presented here.
It might be argued that policy changes were endogenous responses to
increasing migration in the period covered by our analysis. However, the
build up to IRCA was gradual and commenced several years prior to the
period covered by our analysis. Sanctions were enacted by the U.S. House
of Representatives twice in the early 1970s but subsequently blocked in the
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Table 8.5 OLS coeﬃcients for three dynamic models—Male participation in
migration (male USMIGt)
All regions













% change border control 0.015
(.005)∗∗
% change ER .012
(.008)∗∗
% change MGDP .043
(.029)
% change US GDP .075
(.038)∗
R2 .948 .948
Notes: Dependent variable: Weighted total of male international workers in village. All mod-
els were estimated with village ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are in parentheses. N   1,760.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.Senate. President Carter proposed sanctions against employment of un-
authorized immigrants and legalization in 1977. Following several years 
of debate and the establishment of the Select Commission on Immigration
Reform, IRCA was ﬁnally passed in 1986. It might also be argued that
IRCA was a response to economic recession, which in turn could be corre-
lated with immigration. However, by the time IRCA was passed, the early
1980s recession was largely over. There was more unauthorized Mexico-to-
U.S. migration after the 1982–1983 recession, and migration accelerated in
the 1990s (Martin 2003, chapter 7).
Our analysis uses ﬁxed eﬀects to control for unobserved village charac-
teristics on migration. It might be argued, however, that the eﬀects of
IRCA and NAFTA on migration probabilities varied across regions.
IRCA’s eﬀects may have been diﬀerent in rural areas in which the preva-
lence of migration was high prior to the policy’s implementation. The
North American Free Trade Agreement’s inﬂuence on migration may have
been diﬀerent in regions with high agricultural potential or high levels of
industrialization. How these regional characteristics might have inﬂu-
enced migration is not clear a priori. For example, the inﬂuence of a large
manufacturing sector on NAFTA’s migration eﬀects could be positive (in
the case of internationally competitive industries) or negative (in the case
of industries that were protected by Mexican trade policies prior to
NAFTA). A high prevalence of migration prior to IRCA could reﬂect a re-
gion’s vulnerability to immigration reforms or an enhanced ability to adapt
to reforms, for example, through amnesty programs. A rich agricultural
base could reﬂect opportunities for expanding agro-exports post-NAFTA;
however, labor-saving technological change is concentrated on high-
potential lands. To explore the sensitivity of policy ﬁndings to regional
conditions, we reestimated the model including, as explanatory variables,
interactions between the following:
• IRCA and the share of villagers who were international labor migrants
in 1980
• NAFTA and the share of cultivated land that was irrigated in 1980
• NAFTA and the share of manufacturing in state GDPs in 1980
We chose 1980 values for these variables to minimize possible endo-
geneity bias. In no case was an interaction term signiﬁcant in explaining
migration probabilities. Inclusion of these interactions did not qualita-
tively alter the eﬀects of the policy variables presented earlier.
A number of other economic and policy changes were more or less coin-
cident with IRCA and NAFTA. Foremost among these were the peso de-
valuation of late 1994 and 1995 and enactment of a major welfare reform
in the United States in 1996.
We attempt to disentangle the eﬀects of currency devaluations from
those of policy shocks by including changes in the peso-dollar exchange
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exchange rate. However, this was not the only period of signiﬁcant devalu-
ation in our time series. We believe that there is suﬃcient variation in our
exchange-rate variable from 1980 to 2002 to control for currency eﬀects.
Other policies that could have aﬀected immigration were enacted within
several years of IRCA and NAFTA. Foremost among these was the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PL 104-193; PRWORA), which singled out immigrants. Most legal immi-
grants arriving after August 22, 1996 are not eligible for federal welfare as-
sistance until they have been in the United States for at least ﬁve years, and
many legal immigrants receiving assistance when PRWORA was enacted
lost their eligibility for beneﬁts. Enacted only two years after NAFTA,
PRWORA’s eﬀects could conceivably contaminate our ﬁndings if restrict-
ing immigrants’ access to beneﬁts created a deterrent to immigration. In a
study of agricultural counties in California, Green, Martin, and Taylor
(2003) found that PRWORA reduced the number of adults receiving cash
assistance; however, controlling for employment and other variables, the
estimated eﬀect of the policy change was not large. Borjas (2002) con-
cluded that much of the potential impact of welfare reform on immigrants
outside of California was undone by the actions of state governments.
Many states—particularly those with large immigrant populations—
chose to oﬀer state-provided beneﬁts to otherwise ineligible immigrants.
Empirical studies overwhelmingly point to employment and wages as the
primary economic drivers of immigration. These considerations raise
doubts about the extent to which welfare reform inﬂuenced immigration.
Due to mortality, some (mostly older) individuals disappear from our
synthetic cohorts of migrants and villagers as we go back in time—that is,
they are not alive to be counted at the time of the survey. If old villagers are
less likely to migrate, this will result in an upward bias in the estimated
share of villagers in the United States (and thus a downward bias in the es-
timated migration trend), and this bias will be larger the farther back in
time one goes. The key question relevant to our analysis is whether this bias
alters the estimated eﬀect of policy changes on migration. We explored this
possibility by estimating the model separately for younger age cohorts of
villagers (i.e., those who were sixteen–thirty-ﬁve years old in 1980 and thus
less at risk of being aﬀected by mortality over the study period). There were
no signiﬁcant changes to our econometric ﬁndings. Our ﬁndings on the
eﬀects of policy reforms on migration appear to be robust to the ways in
which we construct our synthetic cohorts.
8.7 Conclusions
The impacts of NAFTA, IRCA and increased U.S. border enforcement
are ambiguous a priori. Each policy change potentially has both positive
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made it diﬃcult to test for impacts of policy shocks on Mexico-to-U.S. mi-
gration dynamics. The Mexico National Rural Household Survey provides
retrospective migration histories from a nationally random sample of rural
Mexicans. This makes it possible to isolate migration trends and control
for place-of-origin characteristics while measuring the impacts of policy
shocks on the share of rural Mexicans working in the United States.
Several general ﬁndings emerge from our analysis. First, international
labor migration from rural Mexico has followed an upward trend from
1980 to 2002 but is driven overwhelmingly by past migration, reﬂecting the
central role of migration networks. Second, policy variables signiﬁcantly
inﬂuence migration, but not as much as macroeconomic variables. The
IRCA and NAFTA had some impact on curtailing migration; however,
increased border enforcement appears to have had the opposite eﬀect. No
policies are able to counteract the eﬀects of a changing macroeconomic en-
vironment. Third, the inﬂuences of both policy and macroeconomic vari-
ables are small compared with network eﬀects embodied in past migration.
A unique contribution of this analysis is the insight it oﬀers into the dy-
namics underlying female and male migration. Policy shocks and macro-
economic variables have diﬀerential eﬀects on female and male migration,
quantitatively (in the case of NAFTA and IRCA) and, in some cases, qual-
itatively (in the case of Mexico and U.S. GDP growth). The role of Mexico
GDP growth in loosening liquidity constraints on migration appears to be
more important for females than males, while the impact of U.S. income
growth is greater for males.
Although own-gender migration networks are signiﬁcant and large,
cross-gender network eﬀects are small. Past research has suggested that
female migrants follow males, for example, for purposes of family reuniﬁ-
cation. However, we ﬁnd that past labor migration by male villagers has 
a very small though signiﬁcant eﬀect on female labor migration. That is,
controlling for community eﬀects and long-run migration dynamics, labor
migration networks are gender-speciﬁc. Future economic research is war-
ranted on gender asymmetries in networks and their inﬂuence on migra-
tion propensities.
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